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R ecently Columbia University awarded Kemp medals for 'distinguished 
public service by a geologist' to Gerald J. Wasser burg, professor of geology 
and geophysics at th e California Institute of Technology, and th e late Paul 
Werner Cast, who was professor of geology at Columbia and chief of the 
Division of Planetary and Earth Sciences in NASA's Johnson Space Center in 
Houston. Professor Wasserburg's response at the presentation constitutes an 
appropriate tribute to the memory of Paul Cast, who at the time of his dea th 
was president of AGU's Section of Volcanology, Geochemistry, and Petrol-
ogy. (Ed.) 
IT is an honor for me to receive the J ames Furman Kemp Medal. 
have a particular feeling of personal 
satisfaction because this award is 
shared with Paul W. Gast. When Paul 
and I heard of the award , we were 
both pleased. Since Paul was a Co-
lumbia man (both as a student and a 
professor) he knew about the Kemp 
medal, but I was puzzled ; I just knew 
something about Kemp. When I re-
ceived the message , the only thought 
that came to my mind was a book 
and a rock classification system that 
are still engraved on my memory 
from a sophomore course in petrog-
raphy . 
It seems that both pleasure and 
puzzlement are parts of any award . 
The recipient is pleased to get it , and 
surpri sed to find that he has so many 
friends, puzzled as to why he was 
chosen, and possibly puzzled about 
what it really means. Most o f the 
interested world are just puzzled as 
to why the lucky fellow got the 
award at all . Columbia University 
and the Kemp committee have the 
obligation to explain things to the 
outside world , but I have to decipher 
my o wn private puzzlement. Part of 
the puzzlement a bout what a Kemp 
medatist is, fo rces one to think of 
two things: what it is that he has 
done as an individual, and what the 
Kemp medal stands for. 
This has pro mpted me to think 
about the past several years and has 
brought to mind a kaleidoscope of 
conflicting experiences. There is no 
simple way for me to synthesize 
them , and I suppose the best way to 
say something meaningful to you is 
to tell you a little history and to 
meander through considered preju-
di ces and conclusions. 
Most of my professional career 
has been spent as a university profes-
so r (a teacher and researcher with 
only very mo dest involvement either 
in consulting or in large-scale pro-
grams) . I participated in some small 
studies of space missions and had an 
intent and a commitment to work o n 
the lunar samples if and when the 
Apollo missions were successful. The 
view that they might be successful 
was held in some doubt o r ignored 
by the majority of our profession 
until it ' rea lly' happened . This ·pecu-
liar viewpoint persisted well after it 
was an established national program 
that was being pursued with great 
vigor and large fiscal expenditures by 
both government and industry . 
In 1967, Pau l Gast and 1 ohannes 
Geiss suggested that I serve as an ad-
visor to the Science and Applications 
directorate at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center in Houston. Later, after Apol-
lo I I , I was to even the sco re by con-
vincing Paul that he had to go down 
to MSC and serve within NASA in a 
role of science management. This 
suggestion was fo llowed up, and an 
official advisory group was brought 
together to serve only in the special 
area of ' lunar samples.' It was called 
the Lunar Sample Analysis Planning 
Team. In the acro nymic argot of 
NASA we were spelled LSAPT and 
were called 'Less Apt.' Sometimes 
what you are called is more impor-
tant than how you spell it. The total 
number of members was typical of 
committees, being around a dozen, 
although it has always been my opin-
ion that there were exactly 13 mem-
bers, enough for a coven. 
At first the committee existed as within the LSAPT membership a dis-
an educational scheme (preschool) tinctive sensibility of broader re-
for some of the scientific commu- sponsi bility developed tha t was con-
nity , to enable us to learn about trolled in part by a love for the lunar 
what was happening, and also to pro- samples but was much broader and 
vide some limited advice on what to encompassed concepts of the overall 
do with the moon rocks after they lunar science program. Of this gro up 
were returned, and finally to add there were the four ho rsemen, alpha-
some scientific prestige to a small sci- ' betica ll y , J. Arnold , P. Gast, R. 
ence-directed organization within a Walker , and myself. Somewhere, in 
much larger structure that was dom- the leaky traile rs that were o ur quar-
inated by flight syste ms engineers te rs, it was found that when we 
and managers. The committee was could identify matters of exquisite 
hard working and serio us; they began sensitivity and importance (distinct 
to get educated in the complex ities from questions of vested interest) , it 
of the enormous undertak ing and was possible to get the attention o f 
became deeply invo lved in working the very highest-level administrato rs 
together and worrying about the and to ultimately establish a dialogue 
problems that were exposed to them. with the management at inte rmediate 
In genera l, they were outsiders, but and lower levels when it was needed. 
they still served as a useful fo rum This, then , helped to establish 
and filter to equipment and proce- a n o th e r co mmittee , the Science 
dural problems that were presented Working Panel, which attempted to 
to them by MSC staff; they thus al-
lowed MSC manage ment to obtain 
independent evaluation o f matters 
that required internal decisions. 
Time went o n, and as the incred-
ible A polio flight successes con tin-
ued, LSAPT worked more intensively 
but with very little impact on the 
m~or and critica l science decisions 
that were already made very early in 
the game by NASA. These decisions 
were often based on earlier scientific 
advice that was not updat ed and was 
for the most part received from 
people who were no t knowledgeable 
in detail or who were not in contin-
uing contact with the program. Some 
of this advice had o rigin ated fro m 
the National Academy o f Sciences 
with no commi t ment on their part to 
fo llo w through or reevaluate. Some 
of it o riginated from an internal 
high-level NASA committee that was 
unaware of the real questions and 
problems. Since the purpose of the 
Apollo program was to land men on 
the moon and have them return 
safely, it is no t surprising that the 
ro le o f science in the decision-making 
process was no t larger. And , even 
within this hierarchy , since Apollo 
was a flight missio n, flight experi-
ments (e.g., flight hardware) deserved 
and got higher priority and attention 
than o ther important 'experiments.' 
So mehow, in the heat of the mis-
sions, the enormous impo rtance o f 
the lunar samples and of lunar sci-
e n ee b ecame more evident , and 
Paul Cast 
bring the various science disciplines 
together with the flight people and 
NASA headquarters, so that existing 
experiment plans wo uld be improved 
and more complex and new experi-
ments co uld be discussed and as-
signed prio rities. It was there we 
often learned that the scientists were 
not always willing to take a broad 
overview when they were forced to 
operate under the severe time con-
straints o f a mission in which every 
minute counts. We also found that 
serious and c ritical hardware respon-
sibilities o ften lay in no man's land , 
with no good interface be tween sci-
en ce and engineering. One of the new 
experiments that we aided in getting 
on a missio n failed to function be-
cause the principal investigato r gave 
the very si mple device to a subcon-
tractor and did not himself verify 
that it rea lly functioned- a screw was 
too lo ng, so that a sliding gate did 
not close. This happened a little too 
far from the loca l hardware store to 
get a fix. 
Both before and after Apollo 11 , 
when we staggered back to our uni-
versities, we often met colleagues 
who posed questions and criticisms 
with the phrase, ' Why don ' t they do 
thus and so?' My gracious response 
was, 'Who in the hell are " they"? 
Why don't you . . . ? This even oc-
curred with some LSAPT members 
who later worked on lunar samples 
but quit as advisors becau se they did 
not want to work on ' NASA 's' prob-
lems. This iso lationist attitude on the 
part of some of the scien tific com-
munity did no t aid in estab lishing 
priorities, o r cause or alter actions, 
and was due either to an intrinsic 
unwiJiingness to accept responsibility 
or because there was no ve hicle that 
would e n a b le them to become 
knowledge able about the actual 
problems and aid in their solution . 
In spite o f the normal intense 
competition that characterizes scien-
tists, a spirit developed that recog-
nized the real issue, which was to do 
scie nce with Apo llo, and saw that the 
success of so enormous an enterprise 
could not and should not be associ-
ated with any one individual's name. 
The real ex periments of Apo llo are 
an extremely complex matrix of 
overlapping observations and con-
cepts that have given us our first 
d eep und e rs t a nding of another 
planet . This has resulted in a new 
cosmo politan scientific co mmunity 
that is deeply committed to lunar sci-
ence and will undoubtedly gro w into 
an even broader community of solar 
system scientists. 
Well before the Apollo missions 
drew to a close, it was clear, in cer-
tain circles in the NASA administra-
tio n and the scientific community, 
that the flight program and the sci-
ence program were different. When 
the flight program was over, t here 
sti ll remained the great problems o f 
Apo llo Lunar Surface Experiment 
Package (ALSEP) data acq uisition 
and evaluation, the study both of the 
reduced data and of the lu nar sam-
ples, the synthesis of these data , and 
the preservation of these treasures 
for future generations. Although the 
N a ti o nal Aeronautics and Space 
Administration has in its charter a 
specific commitment to space sci-
ence, it is a lso preeminantly com-
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mitted to flight programs. It was 
(and is) thus necessary to establish 
the importance of reaping the scien-
tific fruits of the flight missions by 
supporting a prolonged, but not in-
definite, phase of postmission study. 
This matter was addressed in a sum-
mer study that outlined the basis for 
such a postmission program (a docu-
ment called the yellow peril). 
We are now starting this postmis-
sion mode , and the concept is appar-
ently accepted as a policy. There is, 
however, no such policy defined for 
postmission phase studies for Mariner 
Mars or for any of the other space 
exp loration programs. Nor is the sci-
entific community willing or ready 
to answer the difficult but legitimate 
question- When is it reasonable to 
terminate such studies? 
One hard lesson must be learned, 
remembered , and put into practice: 
Adequate sc ientific management 
must be an intrinsic part o f all stages 
in large-scale t echnical endeavors. 
This participation must begin with 
the definition of the mission itself 
and continue on an interactive, dis-
cursive basis into the mission and 
beyond to the final evaluation. The 
scientific community must be willing 
and able to participate in the plan-
ning and engineering as well as the 
decision-making functions. This will 
take a great deal of time on the part 
of the general scientific community 
in the universities and of the govern-
ment o r industrial sponsors or partic-
ipants. To a large extent, the integ-
rity of the universit y scientists will 
be dependent on the extent to which 
financial and moral support of the 
universities from nongovernmental 
sources can assure a basic indepen-
dence. 
However, alo ng with the basic 
independence, the university scien-
tists must not look upon the agency 
scientific establishment as simply the 
people who watch the technical de-
tail s w hile they have the great 
thoughts. Good science requires t hat 
active capable scientific wo rk go on 
within the agency involved. In bal-
ance, the agency management must, 
at aU levels, honestly and openly so-
licit the scientific participatio n that I 
have described and must not consider 
the scientist s as high priests who are 
ca lled in at some magical moment to 
bless the venture. Further, the 'i n 
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house' agency scientists must not 
consider themselves as totally privi-
leged, with special access to the mis-
sion science, but should welcome 
participation from the outside scien-
tists and recognize that they also 
have an obligation to support their 
co lleagues at large. 
In all this discussion I have tended 
to e mphasize the problems that 
weighed on us, for the purpose of 
trying to identify for you critica l 
problems in the interaction between 
the science co mmunity and major 
programs in government agencies. It 
is clearly my opinion that some of 
these problems may be addressed 
with good will and with appropriate 
managem ent procedures in both 
communities. I have not emphasized 
the incredible successes of the Apollo 
missions and of Apollo science. The 
excellence of both are manifest to 
the world at large, and the vigor of 
Apollo science, wh..ich is really the 
beginning of a new planetary science, 
is displayed in the literature and the 
activity of first -rat e scientists 
throughout the world . Some distin-
guished work in lunar science has, of 
course , been carried out through the 
participation of members of Colum-
bia University, including their many 
contributions to the fundamental 
measurements of lunar heat flow and 
lunar seismic activity. Of course, 
many of the science management 
problems that I have referred to have 
been apparent o n a smaller level to 
tho se members of the Lamont-
Doherty Laboratory who have been 
doing planetary exploration using 
floating ships, not space ships. 
Currently , there is much concern 
when we look at the immediate and 
distant future with the obvious re-
quirements placed upon us by our 
natural resources, which range from 
sunlight to society . Some of the 
problems are clear in the realm of ap-
plied science, but they are not sepa-
rable from 'pure' science, just as 
technology is not separable from sci-
e nce. These problems have been 
around in some fashion or another 
since Adam. There is an excellent 
article in the first issue (beginning o'rt 
page I) of Economic Geology, which 
was cofounded by J. F. Kemp in 
1905. This article, by Fredrick Leslie 
Ransome, is tit led 'The Present 
Standing of Applied Geology.' With 
minor rewording and a scale factor 
appropriate to present technology, 
his comments apply fully to all that 
has been said tonight. They apply 
today to the problems of space ex-
ploration, choosing sound sites for 
nuclear reactors, ocean mining, or 
the search for earth resources. 
Ransome stated , 'From the prac-
tical point o f view, the installation of 
a modern plant which may mean an 
initial outlay of more than a million 
dollars is warranted only when the 
cor responding efforts have been 
made to ascertain the extent, struc-
tural relations and genesis of the ore 
body that is proposed to exploit.' He 
goes on, 'Economic Geology is pre-
eminently an appropriate field for 
government activ ity . The cost of 
comprehe nsive studies and the 
proper presentation of the results is 
such that, if left to private enterprise, 
the investigations would necessarily 
be incomplete. The results of thor-
ough economic studies are of recog-
nized value to the community and 
that value must always largely de-
pend upo n a well-founded confi-
dence in the integrity, impartiality 
and ability of the members of the sci-
entific corps .... But that the official 
work of a single government bureau, 
however large and influential, should 
represent, so nearly to the point of 
exclusion, the activity of an impor-
tant branch of science is best neither 
for the bureau nor for the science.' 
From a personal point of view, a 
big change occurred in me and in 
Paul Gast. We went from small labo-
ratories and a few students to face 
much larger and more complex prob-
lems. Some people have even sug-
gested that I had my rough edges 
knocked off- only to expose a jagged 
stainless steel interior. This person-
ality trait does not seem to charac-
terize a Kemp medalist - and cer-
tainly not Kemp, who was described 
by a contemporary as being of 'bril-
liant wit, elegant form of expression 
and ready tact which made him es-
pecially suitable for many occasions.' 
Both Paul and I found that o ur 
participation in the Apollo missions 
had major effects on our families. 
One day when I called home to let 
my wife Naomi know where I was, or 
was going, my son answered the 
phone. When I told him I was at 
some airport going someplace else he 
said, 'Well, that figures.' Paul and I 
were in frequent communication by 
phone when we were not together. 
Since there were so many things to 
do, we would stretch the day by 
using the three-hour time difference 
between New Jersey and California. 
Paul would call me at home when he' 
got to the office at Columbia. Being 
a gentleman, he would usually wait 
until I finished breakfast, although I 
didn't always get to shave. Being a 
night person, I would get even and 
stretch the day further by calling 
Paul at home after I returned from 
work.This frequent exchange of ideas 
and viewpoints was intimate and 
important and I shall miss it very 
much. 
Paul's recent death has taken 
away a deep personal friend and a 
creative scientist whose intelligent 
and wise counsel are to some extent 
symbolized by this medal. 
The real meaning of the Kemp 
award became clearer to me upon 
finding out about the previous recipi-
ents, all of whom were earth scien-
tists or engineers with a serious 
involvement in advising and partici-
CORRECTION 
An error has been discovered in 
the reported recovery figures for leg 
24 in the abstract 'Igneous and Meta-
morphic Rocks Recovered by the 
Deep Sea Drilling Project, Legs 1- 31' 
by W.B. Friesen (E$S, 54, 983- 985, 
1973). 
A revision of Figure 7 showing 
the correct recoveries is reproduced 
below. The leg 24 recovery and the 
cumulative recovery in Table 1 and 
the leg 24 recovery in the histogram 
(Figure I) should be adjusted to 
show 74.0 m. Changes in Figure 7 
should also be made in the world 
map (Figure 2). 
pating in m<Uor engineering enter-
prises and public works. The natures 
of the involvement and of the enter-
prises have changed since the time of 
men like Kemp, who straddled the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
but the sense of these functions has 
characterizeQ all Kemp medalists. The 
first recipient of this medal was 
Charles Peter Berkey, who started as 
a junior associate of Professor 
Kemp's, then became his acknowl-
edged su ccessor, and ultimately 
translated Kemp's experience in engi-
neering works in the city of New 
York to the engineering geological 
problems of Hoover Dam. Such enor-
mous contributions humble any 
things that I personally might have 
done, and I receive this medal as a 
symbol of the contributions of the 
co mmunity of dedicated persons 
who participated in the science plan-
ning and guidance of the Apollo mis-
sions for a decade and who success-
fully sought the rich scientific fruits 
of the greatest technical effort so far 
carried out by our society. 
G.J. Wasserburg, professor of geology and 
geophysics at the California Institute of 
Technology, served on the Lunar Sample 
Analysis Planning Team from its formation 
prior to Apollo 11 through Apollo 1 4; he 
served as an advisor to NASA on several 
other committees. He obtained degrees in 
physics and geology at the University of 
Chicago, where he took his doctorate under 
M.G. Inghram Ill and H. C. Urey. 
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